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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE PERFORMANCE. 
ANALISYS OF FAMILY AND NON FAMILY FIRMS IN ITALY. 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses how board composition can affect not only the financial, but also the social 
performance of Italian family and non-family firms. Results confirm an improvement in firm 
profitability when its board dimension decreased or its number of independent directors increased. 
As for social aspects, performance depends on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Board’s 
decision-making process, as well as on the corporate culture and the individual culture of directors. 
The role of the Board may be important in shaping corporate culture and thus the sensitivity and 
awareness of the corporate socio-political dimension of management, if it is acknowledged at a 
leadership role level. 
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Resumen 
Este trabajo analiza cómo afecta la composición del Consejo de administración al rendimiento 
financiero y social de empresas familiares y no familiares italianas. Los resultados confirman una 
mejora en la rentabilidad de la empresa cuando el tamaño del Consejo disminuye o el número de 
directores independientes aumenta. En cuanto a aspectos sociales, el rendimiento depende de la 
efectividad del proceso de toma de decisiones del Consejo, tanto como de la cultura corporativa y 
la cultura individual de los directores. El papel del Consejo es importante para dar forma a la 
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1. Introduction 
A corporate governance system should provide proper incentives for both the Board and 
Management to pursue objectives that are in line with the interests of the firm and its shareholders. 
Factors of corporate governance can be split into two groups: internal and external mechanisms. 
Internal governance mechanisms include ownership concentration, board composition, executive 
compensation, top management replacement, the monitoring of executive decisions and the 
protection of outside investors. External governance mechanisms refer to the effectiveness of a 
stock market in controlling corporations so that a firm may be purchased when it is 
underperforming.  Creating a satisfactory corporate governance system generally involves 
changing a nation’s corporate and securities laws to strengthen the listing and disclosure 
requirements for its stock exchanges (Megginson, 2005).  
A central topic of corporate governance discussion is the Board of Directors, which 
represents a mechanism aimed at the control and direction of companies. Menon and Umapathy 
(1987) assert that board function is to supervise the activities of the firm, evaluate the managers 
and analyse whether the inputs have been used efficiently. To understand the importance of the 
Board on business success, many theoretical perspectives (in literature) have been formulated. 
They highlight the significance the Board has in solving different organizational problems.  Thus, 
numerous researchers have tried to understand its contribution to the improvement of 
performance.  
In the international context, a certain type of firm – the family firm - assumes particular 
relevance for the important role it plays in the economic system. In the Italian context, moreover, 
this type of firm assumes great importance in terms of GDP produced (80%), number of firms 
(90%) and job creation (75%) (Zocchi, 2004). They have specific characteristics that derive from 
the strong link that exists between family and firm, in which the Board has a crucial role in 
balancing family and firm interests (Lane & al., 2006).  
This paper analyses how board composition can affect the performance of the firm. To this 
purpose, a multidimensional approach of firm performance - the traditional financial dimension, as 
well as the social dimension - were considered. The emergence of the socio-economic model led 
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firms to accept social responsibility beyond that of shareholder value maximization (Carroll, 1979; 
Freeman, 1984). 
An empirical study was carried out on the Italian firms included in the FTSE MIB Index 40, 
that is the 40 most liquid and capitalised Italian firms. To evaluate their performance, our research 
considered two financial and social measures. On the one hand, are ROA and ROE. On the other 
hand, social performance is measured by the social ratings elaborated by the Agenzia Europea 
degli Investimenti and the AccountAbility.  
This study adds new evidence to previous literature as it empirically tests not only financial 
performance, but also the social performance of the firms analyzed. Previous empirical research 
has investigated the influence of the board on financial performance. Instead, in this study, the 
social and financial aspects were considered as two dimensions of firm performance with the same 
relevance.  
This paper is organised as follows. In the next Section, the conceptual framework is 
presented. Section 3 contains previous literature about the relationship between the Board and 
company performance. Section 4 describes the data and methodology employed. Section 5 shows 
the empirical research results, and the final section discusses the results and presents the main 
conclusions of the study. 
 
2. Conceptual framework  
Firm performance is a multidimensional concept. Over time, this concept has changed and 
methods used for its measurement have been developed. This concept is strongly linked to a firm’s 
conception, its vision, its idea of success, its goals and finally to its strategy. As a mechanical 
system, the main purpose of a firm is to obtain profits for its shareholders (Ackoff, 1981: 25).  
Consequently, it considers only one dimension of performance and focuses only on financial 
aspects. However, different visions imply different goals, different concepts of business success 
and different strategic orientations. The link between strategy and performance measurement 
systems has been extensively covered in the literature (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). In this sense, a 
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performance management process should be linked to vision, business objectives, strategic goals, 
critical success factors, critical task action plans and performance measures (Bitici et al., 1997). 
One of the first theoretical frameworks used to define and measure performance is the 
Pyramid Dupont model, which has a hierarchical structure based on financial measures (Kennerley 
and Neely, 2002). The use of financial measures has long been dominant both in theory and 
practice. Since the eighties, however, the traditional measurement systems have been subjected to 
numerous criticisms that highlight their limits. Johnson and Kaplan (1987) showed that traditional 
systems were designed in relation to business environments significantly different than those that 
the firm faced in the present. Among other aspects, traditional system’s short-term orientation, its 
ties to the past, its lack of attention to intangibles and its non-correlation with corporate strategy 
have all been criticized (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). Many authors have therefore highlighted the 
need for a multidimensional approach to measure performance, integrating financial and non-
financial dimensions (Chenhall, 2005). The multidimensionality of performance can be appreciated 
from many points of view: stakeholders, management and the period covered by the determinants 
of performance and the organizational units considered (Giovannoni, 2008: 65). 
The multidimensionality of performance derives directly from the multi-dimensionality of the 
firm, and it should propose a real integration of different perspectives rather than a hierarchy of 
linked objectives. Therefore, when speaking about firm performance, one must consider the firm as 
a whole unit. 
In literature, the multidimensionality of the firm is established in reference to the various 
aspects that characterize its life: responsibility profiles, interests involved, expectations of various 
stakeholders, objectives pursued, effects of business decisions and performance obtained (Carroll, 
1979 and 1991; Elkington, 1998; Catturi, 2003). 
 Catturi (2003) summarized the different dimensions that characterize firms utilizing the 
concept of a ‘three-dimensional organism’1. According to this perspective, every firm has an 
economic dimension related to the production process, a socio-community dimension which 
regards the ‘firm community’ and a socio-political dimension that refers to the institutional and 
natural environment in which the firm exists. 
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 The firm can be seen from the perspective of the owner (economic dimension) or the 
perspective of different stakeholders and society in general (socio-community dimension and 
socio-political dimension). However, the different dimensions are not considered following a 
hierarchical logic. The firm should instead try to achieve the objectives for each of these 
dimensions (Catturi, 2003). That is, firm performance must reflect results in each of the areas that 
characterize the firm.  
This approach allows us to identify two types of performances: financial performance (the 
economic dimension) and social performance (the socio-community and socio-political 
dimensions). Financial performance considers the firm result achieved from the owner perspective. 
Although there is no uniformity about how one should express financial performance, it is usually 
associated with profitability or, more generally, with shareholder value creation.  
Although the terms used to define financial performance are different and are not 
theoretically coincident, they refer to a firm's capacity to obtain a positive shareholder result 
(usually expressed in monetary terms).  
The concept of social performance is less unequivocal and has been defined using different 
conceptual frameworks (Carroll 1979 and 1991; Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991; 
Clarkson, 1995; Johnson, 2001). Wood (1991), based on the previous studies of Carroll (1979) and 
Wartick and Cochran (1985), identified principles of corporate social responsibility, process of 
responsiveness and outcomes of firm behaviour as determinants of social performance, which is 
then defined as ‘a business organization's configuration of principles of social responsibility, 
process of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate 
to the firm's societal relationships’. Clarkson (1995) emphasized the importance of stakeholders, 
stressing that a firm does not have a relationship with society in general but with its stakeholders. 
In this sense, social performance can be assessed in terms of a firm’s capacity to fulfil stakeholder 
requests. Finally, the social audit approach concerns the internal and external measurement 
processes (related to social screening used for ethical funding) for identifying the social impact of 
an organization (Johnson, 2001). 
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3. The Board and performance   
3.1. Board characteristics and firm performance 
Assuming that a board presence is fundamental for a company, many studies have tried to 
understand the influence a Board has on company performance. These researchers referred to the 
‘financial’ aspect of company performance, probably because it can be measured more easily and 
objectively. In particular, they tried to analyze how financial performance changes when there is a 
different board structure, usually defined according to two characteristics: size and composition.  
Regarding size, many studies have shown that large boards are generally less effective than 
smaller ones, emphasizing a negative correlation between board size and company performance 
(Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). When a board has many directors, it is more possible that 
some of them take the attitude of a ‘free ride’ and do not participate in the others’ activities. Boards 
are in fact organized by collective decision-making. When their dimension increases, agency 
problems (such as ‘free-riding’) also increase, and boards become more of a symbol rather than an 
effective part of the organization (Thomsen, 2008). Yermack (1996) also tried to empirically verify 
this negative correlation, using a sample of large U.S. corporations and analyzing the relationship 
between their board size and Tobin’s Q ratio2 performance measure. With a similar approach, 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) proved the negative correlation of the two variables on a sample of small 
and mid-size Finnish companies. However, other studies have obtained different results. For 
example, Beiner et al. (2004) supported the idea that board size and firm performance are not 
correlated, while Coles et al. (2008) showed that the two variables had a positive relationship in 
complex organizations, as a higher number of directors corresponded to a higher level of company 
performance. Likewise, Bozec & Dia (2007) supported this positive correlation arguing that a large 
number of directors can help a company reduce environmental uncertainties through their different 
professional qualities. 
As to board composition, the most relevant aspect is represented by board mixture (the 
number of insider/outsider directors). Following Weisbach’s classification scheme (1988), a director 
can be defined as an insider when he works for the company on a full-time basis. Normally, his 
activity cannot be considered independent of the CEO, since his career is strongly linked to the 
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CEO’s success. Outside directors are not employees of the firm, and they do not have extensive 
dealings with the company, aside from their directorship. Thus, they are independent of the CEO. 
They are usually prominent personalities in other industries or are CEOs of other companies. 
Finally, the Board includes another category of directors, affiliated or grey directors. Like outsiders, 
they are not full-time employees of the company, but they have a long-standing relationship with 
the company, for example, as consultants. Vander Bauwhede (2009) finds a positive relationship 
between the compliance with international best practices concerning board structure and operating 
performance. This author carries out a model using ratings indicative of the election of members of 
the company’s bodies and composition of the board, among others. 
Board directors can be also classified as executive, non-executive and independent, and 
non-executive but non independent (Bosch, 1995). The first play an important role in day-to-day 
management of the company in functions in which they have specific, in-depth knowledge (finance, 
marketing, etc.). They are full-time employees with well-defined responsibilities, but they do not 
have the ability to control the CEO as they are his subordinates. Non-executive and independent 
directors are assigned only if they ‘demonstrate an independence of mind, independence of 
knowledge sources and independence of income’ (McCabe and Nowak, 2008). They cannot be a 
substantial shareholder, a significant supplier or a professional advisor of the company. Finally, 
non-executive and non independent directors are those non-executive directors having any form of 
contractual relationship with the company (such as major shareholder). Thus, they cannot be 
considered independent (Baysinger, Butler, 1985).  
Among these categories of directors, regulators usually define a minimum number of 
outsiders allowed on a corporate board, based on the assumption that independent directors can 
better act in the interest of shareholders, more effectively resolving agency problems (Harris & 
Raviv, 2008: 1798). In this sense, as noted by Adam and Feirrera (2003), board composition of 
outsiders and insiders depends on which of the two can better control a board’s decisions (based 
on the strength of the specific information each has). In general, a higher number of outsiders can 
have a negative effect (due to the ‘free-ride’ problem); however, they also provide more expertise 
on a company’s strategic direction. Thus, the optimal number of outsiders is balanced by two 
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effects. Empirical studies on the insider-outsider ratio suggest that removing inside and affiliated 
directors can be harmful for the company, as they play the important role of providing industry-
specific knowledge (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Moreover, regarding 
decision-making, outsiders are usually less informed on the company situation than insiders, since 
they are part-time employees and sit on different boards.  
So, investigating the potential relationship between number of outsiders and company 
performance, different results have been found. While some studies found a negative correlation 
between these variables (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat & Black, 1999), others supported the 
idea of a positive correlation between the variables (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Dahya & 
McConnell, 2007). However, a large number of these studies suggest that board independence 
has no statistically significant effect on company financial performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1991; Drakos & Bekiris, 2010). 
In contrast, there are few studies available to support a relationship between a Board of 
Directors and corporate social performance (CSP). In particular, the relationship between board 
size and CSP has rarely been studied, although some researchers have analyzed this topic in 
reference to the independence of the directors. Since the Board is responsible for monitoring 
management, it has to ensure that management’s actions are implemented correctly and in tune 
with the needs of multiple stakeholders. On this point, these studies demonstrate a positive 
correlation between board independence and CSP, as companies with a higher percentage of 
independent directors are usually more responsible and sensitive to the different stakeholders’ 
interests (Wang & Dewhirst, 1992; Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995), normally registering better social 
performance ratings than companies with a larger number of insiders (Coffey & Wang, 1998; 
Johnson & Greening, 1999). 
The relationship between board characteristics and the financial/social performance of a 
company has also rarely been investigated. This article represents a further step in this direction, 
trying to study the connection existing between a Board of Directors and financial and non-financial 
performance. In particular, the first hypothesis is: 
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- H1: a board’s size, its level of independence and its percentage of executives affect not only 
the financial, but also the social aspects of a company’s performance. 
 
3.2. The board in family firms 
Considerations about the role and function of a board and the assumptions made about the 
influence that board structure has on firm performance need further investigation, particularly for a 
special class of firms, family firms. 
The family firm assumes significant importance in many countries around the world, in terms 
of GDP, number of firms and job creation (IFERA, 2003). Although there are many definitions of 
‘family business’, the literature is fairly unanimous in considering family ownership (control of the 
firm) and family involvement in management as the main elements that characterize it (Dyer, 
1986). The most important element of complexity that characterizes this type of firm is the strong 
intermingling that exists between company and family. The family becomes a sort of privileged 
stakeholder which has a strong influence on management, governance, objectives, strategies and 
culture of the firm (Neubauer and Lank, 1998). Family welfare and firm survival are so interrelated 
that, it is difficult to distinguish the boundary between them. 
Some characteristics of family businesses are associated, often in a contradictory way, with 
financial and social performance. The strong sense of unity and belonging which is present more 
often in these types of firms can be interpreted either as a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage or as a possible cause of negative phenomena, such as nepotism, which can damage 
the corporate reputation (Kets de Vries, 1993). From the perspective of social performance, family 
businesses often pay serious attention to their immediate environment, but they are much less 
concerned about social issues that do not directly affect their context of reference (Gallo, 2004). 
These two opposing perspectives can be identified: the former claims that the family firms have a 
natural propensity toward higher standards of ethical and social behaviour, while the latter, in 
contrast, argues that the orientation of these firms is to give precedence to the good of the family, 
rather than to the more general social welfare (Deniz and Cabrera, 2005). 
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Several researches have studied the mechanisms of governance in family firms (Neubauer 
and Lank, 1998; Corbetta and Montemerlo, 1999; Lane et. al., 2006). In particular, the role of the 
Board is crucial because it connects property (family) and firm and balances both entities (Lane et. 
al., 2006).  
The previously identified characteristics of the Board maintain their relevance in relation to 
family firms. It is suggested that for family firms, the size of the Board should be small (Neubauer 
and Lank, 1998); however, there are authors who state that a too small board may not have the 
level of competency required (Moore, 2000). While Huse (1994) supports the importance of finding 
balance between independence and interdependence in family firms, the independent status of 
directors is sometimes considered less important in family businesses (Lane et. al., 2006). In 
addition to these common elements, however, there are other ones that characterize only this type 
of firm. 
As noted, the element that most characterizes a family firm is the presence of the family, 
which also affects the relationship between the Board and performance. Thus, the qualitative 
feature that seems most useful to analyze is ‘family independence’ or, looking at the same 
phenomenon from another perspective, ‘family representation’, that is, the dependence of the 
Board on family influence.  
Several indicators can be identified to determine family independence. The most used is the 
number or percentage of seats held by family members. While the presence of family members on 
the Board could lead to greater conflict with possible non-family shareholders or other stakeholder 
categories, causing adverse effects in terms of financial performance (Filatotchev et. al., 2005), the 
presence of non-family members could lead to an increase of external relationships which may 
lead to the use of additional and various types of resources (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). The 
presence of non-family members creates a greater openness which can be positively linked to 
improved social performance, due to the increased ability to consider social issues not directly 
related to owner family interests. The presence of family members on the Board, however, could 
also be related to positive effects on performance. The sense of membership may lead to benefits 
in terms of motivation, emotional involvement and commitment of family members in management. 
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The values of solidarity often present in very cohesive families may facilitate a greater propensity 
towards social issues leading to good social performance. 
Beyond the presence of family members on the Board, another indicator of family 
independence is the percentage of family members among the executives. A high percentage may 
be evidence of nepotism, which means a possible lack of professional competence with adverse 
consequences, especially on financial performance (Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008). In general, the 
use of external managers can provide family firms with greater rationality and objectivity (Schein, 
1983). Dyer (1989) argues, however, that outsiders have greater difficulty in understanding the 
human issues in an organization and have an excessive focus on the short-term. Hall and 
Nordqvist (2008) also argue that possession of formal and cultural competencies is more important 
than whether or not someone is a family member. 
When considering family independence, another factor that should be taken into 
consideration is whether or not the Chairman or CEO is a family member. Many empirical studies 
have shown that the presence of a CEO family member is positively linked with performance when 
the CEO is the firm founder, while it has a negative effect when he is one of the successors 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Sraer and Thesman, 2007). This is usually explained by the fact that 
the founders are self-selected to be better than average in terms of business ability (Thomsen, 
2008). The relationship between the presence of a Chairman or CEO family member and social 
performance has not been studied enough; thus, it is not possible to comment on this relationship. 
Finally, another variable to consider is the number of family generations on the Board. The 
presence of multiple generations on the Board could have two different explanations. On the one 
hand, it could be a demonstration of careful ‘generation change’ planning and an important sign of 
continuity for family involvement in the firm. This could be the manifestation of a firm vision as a 
‘good’ to preserve and transmit to succeeding generations. On the other hand, however, the 
presence of several generations could only signal a formal renewal that does not exist in 
substance, or signal an attempt to maintain family balance and not the firm. The two different 
approaches can potentially have different effects in terms of social and financial performance. 
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Based on the above, one could assume that the peculiarities of a family business should lead 
to a board functioning differently in a family firm than in a non-family firm. Assuming that for this 
type of firm the key characteristic is the presence of familiars, one can hypothesize that: 
- H2: the size of the Board, the percentage of executives and the independence of the Board 
differently affect the performance of family and non-family firms; 




4.1 Sample  
The sample is comprised of Italian firms quoted on the S&P/MIB 40 stock market index of 
Borsa Italiana (the Italian national stock exchange). It should be noted that in June of 2009, the 
index changed its name from the FTSE MIB Index to the S&P/MIB 40 Index, which includes the 40 
most liquid and capitalised Italian companies. The index maintains sector weights of the Italian 
stock market.  
From this list of companies, financial firms and those that did not have social ratings were 
excluded. With these restrictions, the final sample was comprised of 26 companies, using 2008 
information.  
Family and non-family firms were distinguished in order to analyse the significant differences 
between the Boards in the two types of firms. To identify the family firms, two criteria were 
followed: a family owning at least 30% of the capital of the company and at least one family 
member on the Board. Both criteria reflect the two characteristics that the doctrine uses to identify 
family firms: ownership (with a high enough percentage to ensure control) and family involvement 
in management and strategic direction. The threshold of 30% is significant in the Italian context 
because it is associated with the legal obligation to launch a takeover bid on the entire capital by a 
person who reaches this ownership percentage. That is, the law considers this threshold sufficient 
to allow for control of the firm, and if a family holds 30% of the shares, it will control the firm. To 
avoid uncertainty in defining control of the firm, the research set as a condition that the family had 
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to have twice the number of shares as the second largest shareholder. The presence of at least 
one family member on the Board should signify that the family does not view the company as a 
mere financial investment, but that it is involved in firm management. Considering this distinction, 
the sample includes 12 family firms and 14 non-family firms. 
 
4.2 Variables and measures 
Variables were defined to achieve the goals of the empirical research. 
The research focused on the social and financial performance of the companies. One 
financial performance measure was considered: profitability. In a private ownership context, the 
acquiring firm seeks economic gains from the purchase (Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 1998).  Thus, 
the organisational changes that are needed to improve performance are expected to have 
consequences, mainly, on profitability. Hodge (2000) showed that only a few performance 
indicators were common across studies and, among these, profitability was the most frequently 
used. In this study, profitability was measured using return on assets (ROA), which is calculated as 
earnings before taxes to total assets, and using return on equity (ROE), that is the earnings before 
taxes to equity. The ROA variable is mainly used in studies on private companies (Hodge, 2000).  
An advantage of using the ROA is that it measures the efficiency of the asset independently of a 
firm’s financial structure. Instead, the ROE variable was used because it represents the most 
evident and simple method to compare two or more companies and to evaluate management’s 
capacity to create value for the ownership. The ROE historical analysis of a firm is an important 
and objective reference for making the crucial decision of whether or not to invest in a firm. The 
financial data of these firms was been obtained from the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing database. 
As for social performance, several methods of evaluation can be carried out (Griffin and 
Mahon, 1997): reputation ratings (ex.: Fortune Index) or survey; ratings issued by specialized 
organizations; indices or evaluations developed from information supplied by companies (ex.: 
content analysis of social reports); quantitative measurements and case study methodologies. To 
overcome the limitations present in each of these methodologies, more evaluations should be used 
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(Griffin and Mahon, 1997). Two social ratings were chosen for measuring social performance in an 
attempt to reduce the subjectivity of the evaluation without limiting the reliability3.  
The choice to use social ratings does not guarantee absolute objectivity, but it ensures that 
the criteria established by rating agencies, when they act with methodological rigor and 
transparency, are applied uniformly. The AEI Standard Ethics Rating and Accountability Rating 
were chosen as the social variables, because they have two different approaches to social 
performance, which may limit the subjectivity of the criteria chosen by the two agencies. 
To examine how the structure of the Board affects performance, Board characteristics 
considered to be significant were identified. With the purpose of verifying if a larger board is more 
or less effective than a smaller one, board dimension was analyzed, expressed as the number of 
directors on the Board. The research identified how many directors were executive, that is, whether 
directors have an effective role in the day-to-day management of the firm. This variable was 
expressed as a percentage of the board dimension (size of the Board). Finally, to define board 
composition, the presence of independent directors was used. According to the self-discipline code 
of the Italian quoted companies, a director can be considered independent when: 
- he does not have extensive dealings or any form of contractual relationship with the firm 
(or with its controlled firms or with its management) aside from their directorship; 
- he is not a shareholder of the firm in which he is a director; 
- he is not a familiar of any firm executive. 
According to this definition, an executive director cannot be considered independent, but not 
all non-executive directors are independent. This is the reason why board composition was defined 
as a third variable (presence of independent directors), expressed as a percentage of the board 
dimension. 
To provide a more in-depth analysis of the family firms, other important characteristics were 
identified. ‘Family independence’ was evaluated by a number of variables in order to analyze its 
tendency in the sample firms.. 
The first is the number of familiars present on the Board. This was defined using all the 
directors having the surname of the family owner. This assumption has probably led the 
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researchers to underestimate this number. Subsequently, it was verified if the board president 
and/or the CEO were family members. Also considered were how many executive directors of the 
Board were family members, as well as how many family generations were included on the Board 
(using degree of kinship between family members of the Board). 
 
4.3. Method 
In order to test the hypotheses, multivariate linear equations were created for the sample 
firms, where the dependent variable included one of the financial performance indicators (ROA and 
ROE) and one of the social performance indicators (AEI Score and Accountability Score). The 
independent variables (Dimension, Executive and Independent) were proxies for the hypotheses to 
be tested.  Consequently, the following equations were created using an MCO regression for every 
dependent variable: 
ROAi / ROEi / AEI Scorei / Accountability Scorei = ß0 + ß1 Dimensioni + ß2 Executivei + ß 3 
Independenti + ei 
Where  
ROA = Earnings before taxes / Total net assets 
ROE = Earnings before taxes / Total equity 
AEI Score = Social rating elaborated by Agenzia Europea degli Investimenti 
Accountability Score = Social rating elaborated by AccountAbility 
Dimension = number of members on the Board 
Executive = Number of executive members / Total members on the Board 
Independent = Number of independent members / Total members on the Board 
The equations developed divided the sample into family and non-family firms in order to draw 
more relevant conclusions.  
Complementary analysis  
Furthermore, a multivariate regression analysis was applied (using the Ordinary Least 
Squares estimation algorithm with forward stepwise estimation) to more deeply understand the 
determinants of the Board (for family firms) that influence social and financial performance. This 
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estimation procedure only chose variables to be included in the regression model: those that 
allowed for the best fit in statistical terms. Variables were added to the model one by one. At each 
step, the independent variable that passed the entry requirements4, and had a higher correlation 
(in absolute value) with the dependent variable, was selected for inclusion in the model. The 
selection of variables was concluded when no more variables passed the entry requirements. If all 
the variables were included, the estimated model would be as follows: 
ROAi = a0 + ß1 Number of board familiarsi + ß2 President familyi + ß3 Number of executive 
familiarsi +ß4 CEO familyi + ß5 Number of generationsi + ui 
 
5. Results 
Table 1 presents regressions for the total sample, the family firms sample and the non-family 
firms sample. As one can see, the four indicators of the dependent variable were: ROA, ROE, AEI 
Score and Accountability score. That is, two variables representative of financial performance and 
two representative of social performance. 
As can be seen in the first line of Table 1, the results in the total sample showed a negative 
and significant coefficient for Dimension, which means that this variable was inversely correlated 
with the dependent variable, that is, the larger the size of the Board, the lower the ROA. However, 
the coefficient for Independent was positive and significant, so the introduction of independent 
members on the Board increased profitability. Looking at type of company, one can see different 
behaviour between sub-samples. On the one hand, similar to the regression for the total sample, 
there was an inverse relation between Dimension and ROA. On the other hand, the variables for 
the family firms were not significant, so we cannot assert that characteristics of the Board influence 
ROA. Other factors may be significant for family firm profitability. 
In the ROE equation, the coefficient of Dimension was significant and negative for the total 
sample, as was been found for the ROA regressions. However, the variable Independent was not 
significant. Once again, the family firm equation had no significant variables, but the non-family firm 
equation had the same results as the total sample. That is, non-family firms had a marked 
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influence on total sample results: however the size and the number of independent members of the 
Board were not relevant variables to explain family firm performance.  
The relation between dimension and profitability (ROA and ROE) was supported in the 
theory, which suggests that a higher number of members on the Board does not lead to better 
company performance. 
As for social performance, the AEI Score was inversely correlated with the Dimension and 
directly correlated with the Independent variable. That is, companies with larger boards had lower 
AEI scores and those with more independent members had higher AEI scores. The non-family 
sub-group showed the same behaviour as the total sample but with regard to the family firms, all 
board characteristics analyzed were not related to the AEI Score. 
In the regression indicative of the Accountability Score, variables were not significant. 
However, if the sample was separated, one found that in the family firms the Dimension of the 
Board was positively related to this social score and the number of executives was negatively 
related. These results are interesting because this is the only regression for family firms that 
showed significant variables. Firms with a larger board and less executive members were more 
aware of social performance.  
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows the results for the family sample. It should not be surprising that only one 
variable was significant in every equation, as there were twelve family firms and the more variables 
introduced into a model, the less degrees of freedom the model has. As for the four models, the F-
value and the R2 values indicate that there was no misspecification error. 
With respect to the ROA equation, the determinant variable was number of family members. 
The positive sign indicates that the higher the number of familiars on the Board, the higher the 
ROA of the firm.  
In the ROE regression, the number of generations on the Board was positively related with 
ROE. That is, the higher the number of generations that have been a part of the firm, the higher the 
ROE.  
 18  
The variable number of generations also influences the AEI and Accountability scores. In 
both cases, the firms with a higher number of generations on the Board achieved better social 
performance.  
In short, the variables that influenced financial performance are the number of family 
members and generations on the Board; for social performance only the number of generations 
influenced performance. The other Board characteristics had no influence on social and financial 
performance.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions  
The Board of Directors is a central institution of company governance, whose main objective 
is its control. Therefore, the aim of this paper was to investigate the link between board 
composition and performance. The multidimensionality of the concept of performance leads one to 
consider financial and social performance.  
The results confirmed an improvement in firm profitability when its board dimension 
decreased or its number of independent directors increased. This is probably related to the fact 
that a higher number of directors can generate a ‘free-ride’ situation, but an increase in the number 
of outsiders can lead the Board to better act in the interest of shareholders, improving the value of 
their investment. Therefore, size is an important variable for corporate performance; however, in 
reference to social aspects, it should not be overestimated. Social performance depends on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Board’s decision-making process, as well as on the corporate 
culture and the individual culture of directors. The role of the Board, in general, and that of 
administrators, in particular, may be important in shaping corporate culture and thus the sensitivity 
and awareness of the corporate socio-political dimension of management, if it is acknowledged at 
a leadership role level. 
The analysis found no-relationship between financial and social performance and number of 
executives. One reason may be that it is not important how many directors have an effective role in 
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the day-to-day management of the firm, but only that each executive should have a specific and in-
depth knowledge of the particular aspect of the business he is involved in. 
The impact of variables on performance is different in family and non-family firms. This 
means that the findings on the total sample can not be generalized for family firms. In particular, 
financial performance was not affected by any of the variables analyzed. As for social 
performance, in family firms, the Accountability Score, in contrast with other empirical evidence, 
had a positive correlation with board size and a negative correlation with the percentage of 
executives. In other words, for family firms, a larger board seems to give more attention not only to 
family interests, but also to the position of all stakeholder categories involved. In the sample, at 
least one family member was always present on the Boards.  It is likely that the larger the Board, 
the more difficult it is for its actions to be influenced by the family interests present on the Board. 
For the family sub-sample, the executive variable was significant. Results showed a negative 
relationship between social performance, as measured by the Accountability Score, and the 
number of board executives; that is, fewer executive directors led to better social performance. 
This result was related to the assumption that when fewer directors have an effective role in the 
day-to-day management of the firm, they have to act with more responsibility towards all the 
stakeholders. In family firms, the excessive presence of executives could lead to a predominant 
focus on the technical aspects of management, rather than the social ones. 
The empirical analysis showed a correlation between strong family involvement and 
performance. Both the number of family members and the number of generations on the Board 
were evidence of an active participation by the family in the firm. The number of familiars was 
positively related to ROA.  Thus, one can state that the presence of more familiar directors 
improves firm profitability, most likely because they have a direct interest in value creation of the 
firm. Particularly interesting is the positive correlation found between the number of generations on 
the Board and performance (both financial and social). This can be explained because the 
presence of several generations creates a plurality of visions, ideas, skills and experience and 
helps to avoid excessive centralization of power. The presence of several generations is thus 
associated not to a nepotistic approach aimed at maintaining balance between interests unrelated 
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to firm events, but to the creation of a strong sense of belonging that can have a positive effect on 
performance. 
The research results showed that the ‘diversity’ of family firms makes generalizing difficult for 
these types of firms. Every family firm is characterized by a strong uniqueness, due to factors such 
as: the dynamics that characterize each family, how the family considers its firm, the planning and 
implementation of generational succession. The effect of board characteristics examined appears 
to be dominated by specific factors present in this type of firm.  
Mechanisms that link the structure of board and social performance are still not fully evident. 
It would also be desirable to analyze the correlations that exist between the individual 
characteristics of managers (experience, skills, culture, values, etc.) and performance. Moreover, 
subsequent empirical research could extend the analysis to include other cultural and institutional 
contexts in which to compare the results obtained by our investigation.
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Table 1: Multivariate regression results 
Dependent Independents       
ROA Constant Dimension Executive Independent F-value R2 
R2 
corrected 
Total sample 14,037*** -1,347*** 1,030 1,094* 3,159 0,301 0,206 
p-value 0,003 0,006 0,175 0,080 0,045     
ROA                
Family firms 15,212* -1,511 1,721 1,032 0,993 0,271 -0,002 
p-value 0,089 0,146 0,225 0,455 0,444     
ROA               
Non family firms 18,913*** -1,416* -1,034 0,944 4,182 0,556 0,423 
p-value 0,004 0,010 0,364 0,144 0,037     
ROE               
Total sample 39,543*** -2,094* 0,278 0,886 1,755 0,193 0,083 
p-value 0,001 0,054 0,874 0,534 0,185     
ROE               
Family firms 30,269* 0,030 -1,464 -0,495 0,213 0,074 -0,273 
p-value 0,070 0,987 0,560 0,843 0,885     
ROE               
Non family firms 57,886*** -3,364** -3,306 0,902 3,904 0,539 0,401 
p-value 0,001 0,016 0,273 0,577 0,044     
Score AEI               
Total sample 1,840*** -0,125** -0,017 0,181** 3,529 0,346 0,248 
p-value 0,001 0,026 0,837 0,015 0,034     
Score AEI               
Family firms 1,170 0,027 -0,135 0,004 0,570 0,196 -0,148 
p-value 0,161 0,795 0,287 0,975 0,652     
Score AEI               
Non family firms 1,819** -0,159** 0,093 0,224** 2,595 0,464 0,285 
p-value 0,045 0,046 0,590 0,034 0,117     
Score Acc.               
Total sample 0,886** 0,023 -0,084 0,056 1,754 0,193 0,083 
p-value 0,024 0,556 0,203 0,292 0,185     
Score Acc.               
Family firms -0,249 0,138** -0,168** 0,033 7,413 0,735 0,636 
p-value 0,531 0,016 0,029 0,617 0,011     
Score Acc.               
Non family firms 1,418** -0,028 -0,026 0,058 0,336 0,092 -0,181 
p-value 0,032 0,584 0,839 0,409 0,800     
 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.   
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.    
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
Note: The regressions were run with ROI as the dependent variable; the coefficients were 
not significant. This may indicate that ROI is more related to Management than to the 
Board. 
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Table 2: Standardised regression coefficients and statistical significance. 
 
Model  ßeta F-value R2 R2 corrected 
ROA  
Number of family members 1.807** 
(0.038) 
5.934 
(0.038) 0.397 0.330 
ROE 
Number of generations on 




(0.000)  0.786  0.765  
AEI 
Score 
Number of generations on 




(0.000) 0.811 0.792 
 Acc. 
Score  
Number of generations on 




(0.001) 0.662 0.668 
 
The p-value in brackets 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.   
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.    





                                                 
1  Organismic vision spread in the years following World War I (Ackoff, 1981) and still finds advocates 
in different cultural contexts (Landier, 1987; De Geus, 1997). 
2  Developed by James Tobin (1969), this ratio compares two different valuations of the same physical 
asset: the market value of a company's stock and the equity book value of the same company. It can be 
used to reflect the ‘value added’ of intangible factors such as reputation or governance. 
3  Reputation ratings (such as the Fortune Index) or surveys of managers, financial analysts, directors 
and students come from respondents perceptions, often very different, and they suffer from excessive 
subjectivity. The information provided by firms, like those in a social report, could be unreliable because of 
lack of knowledge of the criteria for inclusion and omission of information. Moreover, the scales constructed 
on the basis of this information to qualitatively assess social performance could be affected by the objectives 
of the researcher. The quantitative measurements (such as corporate philanthropy, amount of pollutant 
emissions, etc.) are only indirect and unreliable indicators of overall social performance, and they may be 
applied only for a limited sample of firms. 
4  The ‘significance criteria’ was used as the entry requirement. According to these criteria, only the 
variables that contributed significantly to the model fit were included in the regression model. The individual 
contribution of a variable to the model fit was established by testing, from the partial correlation coefficients, 
the hypothesis of independence between that variable and the dependent variable. The significance criteria 
applied was that the introduced variable was significant at the 5% level (10% for the probability of taking the 
variable out of the model). Likewise, the increase in the R2 value as a result of including the variable in the 
model had to be statistically different from zero. 
